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ABSTRACT
The hypothesis that investors optimize with respect to the mean and
variance of their end—of—period wealth has powerful implications for some
standard questions of interest to international macroeconotnists. The impli-
cations transcend the particular econometric technique used to estimate the
return variance—covarjance matrix.
(1) For conventional estimates of risk—aversion, substitutability between
domestic and foreign securities is close to perfect in the sense thatrisk
premiums are small in magnitude (a few basis points), and thus cannot explain
much bias in forward rates. (2) Nevertheless, as long as risk—aversion is
not zero, foreign exchange intervention still affects the level of the
exchange rate. If interest rates are held constant, the effect is proportionate
to the contemporaneous change in asset supplies, and is more—than—proportionate
if the expectations of future asset supplies also change. (3) Current account
deficits have effects that are comparable to, though smaller in magnitude than,
the effects of equal—sized changes in asset supplies through intervention or
government borrowing. (4) The perceived tendency for dollar depreciation to
be associated with appreciation of the mark against the franc is not consistent
with the implication of mean—variance optimization that the franc should be






Manyimportantquestions in international finance depend critical-
ly on the nature of the exchange risk premium, defined as the expected
rate of return on foreign assets relative to domestic assets. But the
risk premium has proven to be a difficult variable to get a handle on em-
pirically. In past work, in order to bring more structure to bear on the
problem of the risk premium, I have made the assumption that investors
diversify their portfolios so as to optimize with respect to the mean and
variance of their wealth. But the contribution proved to be a negative
one in that, using my econometric technique to impose the constraint of
mean—variance optimization, I was unable to reject the hypothesis that
investors were risk—neutral and that the risk premium therefore did not
exist.' A failure to reject a null hypothesis could always be attribut-
able to low power in the test. Furthermore, one criticism that could be
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andother assets could be accurately measured, a questionable assumption.
We will see in this paper that the hypothesis of mean—variance op-
timization is sufficiently powerful to have important implications that
transcend specific techniques of data computation or econometric estima-
tion. The hypothesis turns out to imply that the exchange risk premium,
even assuming it exists, is extremely small in magnitude. When the sup-
ply of foreign assets is increased by one percent of world wealth——a
large number——the effect on the risk premium is only on the order of .02
—1——2--
percent, or 2 basis points. (By comparison, the forward discount on the
dollar against the mark or yen was about 300 basis points as of early
1985.) This calculation assumes a coefficient of relative risk—aversion
of 2 and a standard deviation for international returns of 10 percent.
Even if these parameters are estimated at levels several times higher,
the implied effects on the risk premium are still of a negligibly small
magnitude. One implication, the answer to the first question considered
below, is that the risk premium is relatively unimportant for evaluating
tests of efficiency in the forward exchange market.
It does not follow, however, that imperfect substitutability be-
tween domestic and foreign bonds is unimportant for all questions of in-
terest. Another way of stating the conclusion——the proposition that
changes in asset supplies need have only small effects on the risk premi-
um to be willingly absorbed into the market——is to say that small changes
in the risk premium have large effects on asset demands and therefore on
the exchange rate. We will see that the framework of optimal portfolio
diversification is a useful one in which to examine some standard ques-
tions regarding the determination of exchange rates. Often it will be
possible to get interesting quantitative results that are not sensitive
to the precise techniques used for measuring asset supplies or estimating
variances and covariances.3—
2.FOUR QUESTIONS
Question 1.Can risk premiums account for findings of a nonrandom
component in the spot rate prediction errors of the
forward rate?
Many authors have statistically rejected the hypothesis that the
forward rate is a conditionally unbiased predictor of the future spot
rate. Several, for example, have found statistically significant serial
correlation in the forward rate's prediction errors. I found autoregres-
sive coefficients on the order of .4 for the pound and the lire (against
the dollar, July 1974 to April 1978) in Frankel [1980, p. 10941. Hansen
and Hodrick [1980, p. 840] regressed the prediction error against the
lagged prediction errors, not just of the own currency, but of four other
currencies as well (October 1974 to April 1978). The mark had an own—
autoregression coefficient of minus .665. Many of the cross coefficients
were significant as well; they had both positive and negative signs, but
similarly large magnitudes.2 Some authors have tested the hypothesis that
the interest differential is an unbiased predictor of the future rate of
currency depreciation, which given covered interest parity is equivalent
to the first hypothesis, and have also rejected it. Cumby and Obstfeld
[1984] found a statistically significant autocorrelation coefficient of
.5inthe interest differential's forecast error for the yen.3
It is well—known that these are all tests of a joint null hypoth-
esis:—4—
(a) that there is no risk premium, so that the forward rate is
equal to investors' expectations as to the future spot rate,
and
(b) that the market is efficient, so that investors' expectations
are equal to the mathematical expectation conditional on
available information.
Some authors, such as Hansen and Hodrick [19801 and Cumby and Obstfeld
[1981], interpret the test results as evidence of the importance of the
risk premium, thus leaving the market efficiency part of the joint null
hypothesis intact. Could nonzero autoregressive coefficients be attrib-
utable to risk premiums?
Let
the ex post percentage change in the spot price of
foreign currency,
fdthe forward discount on domestic currency (or, given
covered interest parity, the domestic interest rate
minus the foreign interest rate),
the ex post expectational error Ls÷1 — where
is the market's ex ante expectation of deprecia-
tion, and
rpthe risk premium on foreign assets e —fd.
The prediction error can be decomposed into the expectational er-
ror and the risk premium:
(1) (1s÷l_fd)=rp+E+1.—5—
Its autocovariance is given by
(2) Cov(s÷i —fd,s —fd1)
=Cov(rp,ts —fd1)
+ Cov(c+i, fd).
Assuming rational expectations, the last covariance term is zero. Thus




The risk premium rp is not observable. But it can be assumed
related to the relative supplies of countries' assets as in a portfolio
balance equation for asset demands.4
(4) x =A+ B(rp).
In inverted form
(5) rp =—B'AB1x.
An increase in the supply of a country's assets requires an increase in
the expected rate of appreciation of its currency (relative to the for-
ward discount or interest differential) for them to be willingly held.5
We use equation (5) in (3)
—1Covx, s—fd1)
(6) Autoregr(s1 —fd)=Bvarsjy
Table 1 reports in column (3) estimates of the ratio appearing in equa-
tion (6), interpretable as the coefficient in a regression of portfolio
shares against lagged prediction errors, in each case pretending for theshare of portfolio allocated to each currency
s -s1
-fdt_l forward rate prediction error
p coefficient of relative risk aversion 2
Note: The data sources and computations are described at length in







































moment that the entire portfolio consists only of dollars and the other
currency in question. Without any way of bounding the parameter B1,
we have no way of judging whether observed autoregression coefficients
are too large to be explained by the risk premium. We must wait for fur-
ther information from mean—variance optimization theory.
Question 2.Can foreign exchange intervention have a meaningful
effect on the exchange rate?
One reason why there has been so much interest in estimating in-
vestors' degree of substitutability among countries' assets (as in the
studies cited in footnote 5) is that it has been thought to determine the
effectiveness of foreign exchange intervention, particularly intervention
sterilized so as to have no effect on money supplies. The argument is
that as the parameter B in equation (4) goes to infinity, B' in equa-
tion (5) goes to zero, so that asset supplies have no effect on relative
expected rates of return nor, presumably, on anything else. But the step
from relative expected rates of return to the spot exchange rate is not
Immediate.
The portfolio share allocated to foreign assets is defined as
(7) x SF/W
where S the level of the spot exchange rate,
F the supply of foreign assets,
D the supply of domestic assets, which we will take
to be dollars in the empirical work,
and W total wealth, SF + D.—7—
The portfolio share allocated to domestic assets is given by
(8) 1—x=D/W.
We take the ratio to get an equation of exchange rate determination:
(9) S=--1---.
Equation (9) says that the exchange rate is determined by the relative
supply of domestic vs. foreign assets and the relative demand for the two
assets. Taking logs,
(10) s =9..+ log(x) —log(1—x),
where s log S
and 9.log(D/F).
We want to know the effect of an unanticipated change in asset
supplies 9.on the exchange rate. If expected rates of return and
therefore the asset demand shares x by equatIon (4) are unchanged, then
the effect is simply proportionate to the change in asset supplies. Giv-
en actual magnitudes of intervention, this would not be a particularly
large effect, even if we are talking about nonsterilized intervention.
But the effect could be larger if the change in current asset supplies
alters market expectations as to future asset supplies, and alters the
expected rate of return and therefore x. Differentiating (10):
(11) =+
1 dx(rp)+1 dx(rp)
d9.. x di 1—xdi—8—
The risk premium was defined to be the domestic—foreign interest
differential minus expected depreciation e The kind of foreign ex-
change intervention we will examine is one that leaves interest rates un-
changed. This is equivalent to sterilized intervention, which holds the
money supply constant, only in the special case (as in IS—LM) where money
demand depends on the interest rate but not on the supply of bonds, and
where the price level does not respond to the exchange rate.6 If one be-
lieves that the interest rate is determined by the supply of money rela-
tive to bonds, then we are not talking about sterilized intervention, but
rather intervention that changes the supply of money and bonds proportion-
ately. The mean—variance optimization model has little to say about the
allocation of the portfolio between non—interest—bearing money and bonds,
so we choose to leave these considerations outside our model and to as—
sume simply that monetary policy is whatever it must be to keep interest
rates constant.




Equation (11) thus becomes
e





(while recognizing that X will be different at different points in time
as x changes). Then equation (13) can be made to look more familiar:
(15) ds =dL+Xd(s1 —s).
If 9.were interpreted as the relative supply of domestic money, then
equation (15) would be the standard monetarist equation of exchange rate
determination, where X would be interpreted as the semielasticity of
money demand.7
As in that literature, we can solve for s as a function of 9.
and s1, substitute for s1 the rational expectation of next period's
and s2, substitute similarly for s2, and so forth. The result
is an expression for this period's exchange rate as a present discounted
sum of the entire future path of expected asset supplies:
(16) ds =th
wheredE(&+j is the revision in the expected value of the asset supply
variable tperiodsinto the future.
The effect of a curreit change in asset supplies on the rationally
expected future path depends on the time series properties of 9..For
example, if 9.follows a random walk, then dE(9.÷) =d9.and ds =d9.,
i.e., the exchange rate simply changes in proportion to the current asset
supply (as we could have guessed directly from (15)). At the opposite
extreme, if 9..follows a random walk on trends, then dE(2..+) r d9.,
and ds =(1+X)dP.(also as we could have guessed directly from (15)).




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In each case, the process is not stationary on levels; first dif—
ferencing is required. But after an innovation in the supply of domestic
assets, the effect on expected future changes damps out fairly quickly.
In no case is the specification of a random walk on trends appropriate.
In different cases, different ARIYIA processes seem most appropriate. To
simplify and standardize, we will consider ARNA (1,1,0); in the case of
the United Kingdom there is a significant autoregressive parameter on
changes of .35. Thus a 1 percent innovation raises the rationally ex-
pected relative asset supply by an estimated (1 + .35) percent in the
2
following period, (1 ÷.35+ .35 )percentin the next, and so forth,
gradually damping out. (The magnitude and significance levels of the
first—order autoregressive parameter are lower for France and Germany.
They are close to zero for Canada and Japan, suggesting that asset sup-
plies for these countries follow a simple random walk on levels.)
Without any way of estimating B and thereforeA, we have no
way of measuring the effect on the exchange rate of expected future
changes in asset supplies. Again we must await the further enlightenment
of mean—variance optimization theory.
Question 3. Canthecurrent account have a meaningful effect
on the exchange rate?
It has been recognized for some time that in models of exchange
rate determination it is not proper to measure the supply of foreign as-
sets as the cumulation of the current account (corrected for foreign ex-
change intervention),8 except in the special case when foreign investors
do not hold domestic assets and so are irrelevant to the determination of—11—
the exchange rate. But the current account will still have an effect on
the aggregate world demand for foreign vs. domestic assets, and therefore
on the exchange rate, if foreign residents have different behavior from
domestic residents.9
We specify three separate asset—demand functions of the nature of
(4): one for American residents, one for European residents, and one for













The subscripts indicate the nationality of the investors. We can aggre-
gate the three equations by multiplying each by its region's share in
W W W
a e r world wealth; w —, w—andw —= 1—w—w,respec— a W eW r W ae
tively; and then taking the sum:
(18) x -= Ar+ (Ae_ Ar)We —(Ar_Aa)Wa + B(rp).
We see that the total world demand for F assets depends not only on
their expected relative rate of return rp, but also on the distribution
of wealth across countries. Assuming that European residents hold the
highest proportion of their portfolios in F assets, followed by rest—
of—world residents (whom we have here assumed not to have their own cur-
rency) and American residents:—12—
(19) A >A >A.
e r a
Then a European current account surplus that increases We will raise
the total world demand for F assets. So will an American current ac-
count deficit that decreases Wa•
Equation (10) provides the link from the portfolio share given by
equation (18) to the level of the exchange rate.To see the effect of a
change in We we differentiate:
ds 1 1
(20) =+—)(A —A). dw x1—xe r
e
(We do not consider any effects on expectations regarding the future.)
As we would expect, a European current account surplus that transfers
wealth to Europeans from the rest of the world will cause the dollar to
depreciate if European residents have a higher propensity to hold F as-
sets. What determines the relative size of Ae Ar and Aa? What are
the magnitudes of the effects on s? These questions too will be an-
swered below.
Question 4.If the dollar depreciates (because of an actual or
expected increase in the supply of dollars), will the
mark tend to appreciate against the franc?
A proposition that circulates widely in European policy circles is
that the value of the dollar (against an average of other currencies) af-
fects the cross exchange rates within the European Monetary System. When
the dollar was weak in the late 1970s, both the mark and the franc appre-
ciated against the dollar, but the mark was the stronger and the French—13—
repeatedly found it necessary to devalue, or in the days of the Snake to
drop out of the arrangement altogether. Since the dollar began its great
appreciation in 1980, the mark has at times been weaker than the franc,
and the French have not found it necessary to devalue as often. The fear
in Europe Is that when and If the dollar makes its long—awaited fall, the
change will take the form of a portfolio shift from dollars into marks,
once again putting downward pressure on the franc's value against the
mark. Giavazzi and Giovannini [1984] examine this problem from several
alternative viewpoints. Here we pursue one of their suggestions, that
the relationship between a dollar depreciation and the franc/mark cross
rate depends on the nature of investor substitutability among the three
currencies in a model of optimal portfolio diversification.
We return to the version of the model In which residents of all
countries exhibit uniform behavior, but we add a third asset
SMM
XM = AM+ B(As) -BMF(s.)
(21)
SF




xMis the share of the portfolio allocated to mark assets, SM is
the spot dollar/mark exchange rate, M is the supply of mark assets, and
similarly for franc assets F. B4 indicates the degree of substitut-
ability between dollars and marks, and BFF the degree of substitutabil-
ity between dollars and francs. We continue to assume interest rates
constant and so we subsume them in the constant terms. The cross rate in
francs per mark is given by the ratio of the two exchange rates. In log




1 d(As) d(s) —[Bd (d)
—
BMFd (d)
1 d(ós) d(s,) —— [—Bd (d)+ BFFd (d)










will each be zero.
d (d)
will
is no effect on the franc/mark cross rate be—
dollar/f ranc rates each simply increase in pro—
the supply of dollars.
increase induces expectations of a further in—
as seems from table 2 to be rational In some
d(s,)
d (d)
will be positive. Consider for the
—14—
s =f—m+ log(x) —log(x),
(22)
where f is the log of F and m the log of M.
Let us assume that there is a depreciation of the dollar that comes








_______ _______ timechange, then dCd)
also be zero, i.e., there
cause the dollar/mark and
portion to the change in
But if the current
crease in the next period,
d (s) ______ cases,then and—15—
moment the special case in which the effect on expected future apprecia-
tion of the two European currencies is equal:
d(s) d(E.s,)
d (d) =d (d)
Then from (23) the condition for a positive effect on the franc/mark rate
is:
B —B B —B
(24) MM MF+FN FF
> o.
XM XF
Ifthe mark is a good substitute for the dollar, relative to the substi-
tutability between the franc and the dollar (BMM is high relative to
then the depreciation of the dollar is indeed more likely to be
associated with an appreciation of the mark against the franc.
It is likely that and will not rise by the same amount.
Which will rise more? If expectations regarding SMandSFare
+1 +1.
rational, then we can answer the question the same way as we did for SM





more than if condition (24) holds. It would then follow from (23)
d s d(s) that
d (d)





were equal. One could extend the reasoning to expectations of
further increases in the supply of dollar assets two periods into the fu-
ture, and more. For each period, the inequality (24) remains the knife—
edge condition that implies an increase in the current franc/dollar rate.'°
Is (24) likely to hold? It is now time to turn to the mean—variance
optimization theory, to help answer this and the preceding questions.—16—
3. ANSWERS FROM THE THEORY OFMEAN—VARIANCEOPTIMIZATION
Inequation (4) we assumed that asset demands as a share of the
portfolio can be expressed as a linear function of the risk premium:
(4) x =A+ B(rp).
In Krugman [1981] and Frankel [1983] (or Frankel [1982] for the n—asset
case) it is shown that under certain assumptions, notably that investors
optimize with respect to the mean and variance of their end—of--period




where p =thecoefficient of relative risk—aversion
=theweight of foreign goods in consumers'
(Cobb—Douglas) utility function
=thevariance of the relative rate of return
r* —r(or in the n—asset case the variance—
covariance matrix) .1
Intuitively, the more important to an investor is risk diversification
(the larger is p or ),theless will he or she shift the portfolio
in response to a given change in expected returns (the smaller is B).
Looking at the inverted form of equation (4) we see that
Arp =p—17—
For the moment, we will consider only portfolios of two assets at a time
(dollars and one foreign currency at a time), to get an idea of magni-
tudes. The variance of the forward rate's prediction error was reported
In column (2) of table 1. The coefficient of risk—aversion is generally
considered to be in the neighborhood of 2.12 Twice the variance is re-
ported in the fourth column of table 1, multiplied by 12 so that it can
be used to estimate effects on risk premiums or interest rates on a regu-
lar per annum basis. The numbers are quite small. They Imply, for exam-
ple, that a 1 percent increase in the share of the portfolio consisting
of dollar assets would drive up the expected rate of return on dollars
relative to pounds by only .02 percent per annum, or 2 basis points! We
see that the risk premium cannot vary much. Since the case for a time—
varying risk premium is the only case made, it follows that the magnitude
of the risk premium is very small.'3
Answer 1: It seems unlikely that the risk premium can explain
significant autocorrelation in forward rate prediction
errors.
In equation (6) we saw that the amount of autoregression in pre-
diction errors which is explainable by the risk premium depends on B',
which we have now seen to be given by p 2.For each foreign currency,
if one wishes to think about a simple two—currency portfolio as in ta-
bles 1 to 3, then B' is a scalar that could be estimated by twice the
variance of (Ls —fd_1).The variance cancels out the denominator in
equation (6), and we are left with simply p times the numerator
Cov(x, s —fd..1),which was reported in column (1) of table 1. Even—18—
if that covariance is multiplied by 2 or higher estimates of the coeffi-
cient of risk aversion, the estimates are extremely small. The small
magnitudes suggest that in studies where statistically significant auto—
correlation is found, a risk premium is unlikely to be the explanation.
At least, that seems to be the implication of the mean—variance optimiza-
tion theory of portfolio balance.
Three points remain to be made. First, the argument is relatively
invariant to measurement errors in the asset supplies. The "true" asset
supplies would have to behave very differently from the measured asset
supplies to have a correlation with the prediction errors which is very
much greater in magnitude than those reported in the first column of ta-
ble 1.
Second, when we equated the variance sperceivedby investors
with Var(s —fd_1),we implicitly assumed that they have no recent in-
formation relevant to forming expectations.2 should be conditional on
currently available information, and therefore should be smaller in mag-
nitude than the unconditional variance. But there is wide agreement that
recent information is of little help in predicting changes in the exchange
rate, that the conditional variance is almost as large as the uncondition-
al variance. (For example, Frenkel and Mussa [1980].) In any case, the
direction of the bias is to overstate the numbers in the first column of
table 1, representing autocorrelation attributable to a risk premium. A
finding of an autocorrelation coefficient significantly greater in niagni—
tude than those numbers would suggest an even more decisive rejection of
rational expectations.—19—
The third point is that, in theory, it should be a portfolio de-
mand for n > 2 currencies that depends on the risk premiums; in inverted
form, each risk premium should depend on n currency supplies, not just
two. Equation (26) generalizes nicely if we consider market efficiency
tests of the sort run by Hansen and Hodrick [19801 and Cumby and Obstfeld
[19841: for a given currency the current prediction error is regressed
against the lagged values of the prediction errors in all of the
cies, not just the own currency. The results of such tests are reported
in table 3.For the period 1973 to 1980 (which is as far as I have con-
structed asset supply data for),F tests reject the null hypothesis of
no autoregression in the prediction errors in the case of several equa-
tions.
The matrix of regression coefficients that are estimated in table
3 can be represented, using boldface to represent five—currency matrices
and vectors,
(27)
[Varcov(M —fd_1)]1Cov(M÷i— fd,As —f&1)
=[Varcov(M—fd1)T'Cov(rp,As —fd_1)
=[Varcov(As —fd1) Ti Cov(B1x,As —fd_1)
=Ivcov(As—
fd_1) Ti Coy(p Q x, As —fd_1)
=pCov(x, As —fd_i).Table 3a: Autoregression of Prediction Errors
Sample: August 1973 to August 1980 (85 observations)
Dependent Independent Variables Dependent





s—s —fd Pound Franc Mark Dollar Yen R F Meantion t4-1 t t
Pound .249 —.117 —.100 _.458* —.028
(.133) (.176) (.164) (.226) (.118) .102.12.003 .028
Franc —.009 —.144 —.037 _.671* .060
(.146) (.194) (.180) (.248) (.130) .122.74* .002 .032
Mark .106 —.392 .065 _.708* .151
(.154) (.203) (.189) (.260) (.136) .153.66* .001 .034
Canadian .047 —.130 .039 —.050 .069
Dollar (.067) (.088) (.082) (.113) (.059) .040.86 —.001 .014
Yen .093 —.221 —.073 —.269 .227
(.150) (.198) (.185) (.255) (.133) .08 1.65 .002 .032
*significant at the 95 percent level
(Standard errors are reported in parentheses.)Table 3b: Autoregression of Prediction Errors
Sample: August 1973 to December 1984 (137 observations)







s—s —fd Pound Franc Mark Dollar Yen R F Meantion
t+1 tt
Pound .143 —.138 .150 _.415* —.024
(.106) (.162) (.157) (.199) (.096) .031.14 —.004 .030
Franc —.070 —.027 .056 —.300 .029
(.117) (.179) (.174) (.220) (.106) .010.26 —.003 .033
Mark .023 —.170 .147 —.384 .031
(.120) (.183) (.177) (.225) (.109) .000.14 —.005 .033
Canadian —.006 _.169* .127 —.065 .032
Dollar (.047) (.072) (.070) (.089) (.043) .041.28 —.001 .013
Yen .060 —.133 .105 —.254 .105
(.117) (.178) (.173) (2.20) (.106) .020.74 —.002 .033
*signif leant at the 95 percent level
(Standard errors are reported in parentheses.)Table 4
Coy. (x ,- s1-fdt1)
x




Pound Franc Mark dollar Yen
Pound -1.464 -0.121 -5.874 1.412 -8.799
Franc -2.317 -1.413 -0.039 +0.025 -0.012
Mark +6.003 +5.195 +4.972 -2.131 -4.331
Canadian
dollar -4.237 -0.715 -0.164 +1.280 +0.956
Yen +40.00 +13.28 +7.082 -5.043 -7.325
The theory implies that the autoregression
coefficient of prediction errors is bounded
by (the corresponding covariance above) x
(the coefficient of relative risk-aversion)
x—20—
We have used, first, the rational expectations assumption that the compo-
nent of As+1 —fdthat is expectational error is uncorrelated with rp;
second, that rp is governed by mean—variance optimization; and third,
that we can approximate the conditional variance—covariance matrix
with the unconditional one so as to cancel out its inverse, as in the
upper bound argument made above. The entire matrix Cov(x, As —fd.1)
(the generalization of column (1) in table 1) is reported in table 4.
Again we can assume p =2.The magnitude of the autoregression param-
eters in table 3 is always far greater in magnitude than twice the num—
5
bers in table 4 (which are shown times 10 ),inother words are greater
than can be explained by the risk premium under the assumption of mean—
variance optimization.
Answer 2: An unexpected increase in the current supply of domestic
relative to foreign assets can have a meaningful effect
on the current exchange rate, especially when account is
taken of effects on expected future asset supplies.
Onepercentincreases in the supply of domestic assets in them-
selves raise the exchange rate by only 1 percent.'4 But the ARIMA esti-
mates reported in table 2 show that a given 1 percent innovation in the
asset supply generates rational expectations of future asset supply in-
creases. We saw in equation (16) that the effect on the exchange rate
will be more than 1 percent, and of a magnitude depending on the semi—
elasticity of asset demand X. Now with equation (14) we see that A
is given by—21—
(28) x= (!+ 1J-)(p
The share of the portfolio allocated to the dollar versus the oth-
er five currencies averaged .49 during the sample period 1973—1980. Thus
+ is about 4.00. The third column of table 5 reports the esti-
x 1—x
mates for X implied by the variance estimates. The coefficient for the
United Kingdom is typical: 2,516 on a monthly basis, or 210 if divided by
12 to allow interpretation of X as a semielasticity of asset demand
with respect to per annum rates of return. The numbers are very high as
estimates of semielasticities of demand, but this is a direct implication
of the theory of mean—variance optimization.
As a preliminary experiment, consider what happens if the 1 per-
cent increase in asset supplies raises the expected permanent rate of as-
set supply growth by as little as 0.1 percent per annum. Our estimate of
X implies that the exchange rate will increase by 21.0 percent! This is
how sensitive asset demands are to expected returns.
In the time series processes estimated in table 2, the effect of
an innovation on future asset supply changes is not in fact permanent but
dies out fairly quickly. Adopting the simple ARIMA (1,1,0) specification,
we saw that a 1 percent innovation in the relative supply of dollars/pounds
raises the relative supply expected next period by (1 + .353) percent, the
2
following period by (1 + .353 + .353 )percent,and so on. We use our es-
timate of X, the semielasticity of asset demand with respect to expected
return, to take the correct present discounted sum of future asset sup-
plies. The total effect on today's dollar/pound exchange rate is estimated




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































because of more rapid damping out of asset supply changes. In the cases
of the Canadian dollar and yen, the asset supply changes are essentially
white noise, i.e., £t follows a random walk, so the effect of a 1 per-
cent innovation is simply 1 percent: the spot rate follows a random walk
in lock—step synchronization with the asset supplies.
The above calculations use semielasticities A that are based on
x =- , underthe artificial assumption that in each case the currency
in question constitutes the entire nondollar portfolio. In reality each
foreign currency considered alone constitutes a smaller part of the port-
folio. As a consequence, the As are considerably larger, but, as table
5 shows, the effect on the exchange rate is virtually the same. The
present—discounted sum is far less sensitive to A than it is to the
asset supply autoregression parameter R.
Answer 3: Theeffectof a current account surplus on the exchange
rate is meaningful in size, but is nevertheless less than
the effect of a government budget deficit that creates an
equal quantity of domestic assets.
Equation (18) says that a European current account surplus that
redistributes 1 percent of world wealth to European residents raises
the demand for European assets, by (Ae —Ar)percent and thus raises
the exchange rate by —j1)(Ae_Ar) percent. The theory of mean—
variance optimzation, as embodied in equation (25), tells us that
1 1 1 1
and A=ct(1——)+----—, e e p 2p r r p—23--
where is the share of European consumption allocated to European
goods and is the share of rest—of—world consumption allocated to Eu-
ropean goods, and we have assumed that everyone has the same coefficient
of risk—aversion p.
The first point to note belongs to Krugnian [1981]: for the wealth
redistribution to have a positive effect, it is not sufficient that
> c, that residents of each country consume relatively more of their
own goods. It is necessary that we also have p > 1. In the case of
risk—neutrality (p =0),residents of each country would prefer the as-
sets of the other country due to Jensen's inequality. The "risk premium,"
as defined above would be, not zero, but fixed at —--) ifconsump-
tion patterns were uniform across residents.'5 In the knife—edge case of
the "Bernoulili investor" who has logarithmic utility (the limit asp
goes to 1), Ae =Ar=
Aaand the distribution of wealth has no effect.
We will continue to consider the more realistic case of p =2,where
A. =--a.—-. Thecurrent account does have an unambiguous effect in
12i4
the expected direction, assuming c > c > c.
What is the magnitude of the effect of a current account surplus
equal to 1 percent of world wealth? Whatever the value of p, because
ae, ar and aa are (weakly) between zero and one the effect on therisk
premium is less than (or equal to) the effect of a government budget def-
icit (or of creation of domestically—denominated assets in other ways
such as foreign exchange intervention) equal to 1 percent of world wealth.
Let us consider the example ae =1.0,c =0.5and =o.o.16Then
a European current account surplus equal to 1 percent of world wealth has
an effect that is (ae —cc)
= asgreat as a budget deficit equal to 1—24—
percent of world wealth. If the United States is at the same time running
a current account deficit of the same magnitude, then it too has an effect
1 that is r — = asgreat. Together the two current account imbal-
ances have the same effect as the equivalent budget deficit. This example
is a limiting case.If Americans consume nonzero German goods and vice
versa, the effect of the current account deficits will be smaller. The
result that the current account should have a smaller effect than an equal
budget deficit was noted by Dornbusch [1983, p. 25].
The effect on the exchange rate of the 1 percent European current
account surplus, using a value of x =inequation (18) is 4.00
(Ae —Ar),which is 2.00 percent using our upper bound values of domes-
tic consumption. Theeffecttogether with an equal U.S. current account
deficit is 4.00 percent. The effect can be greater if there are expec-
tations of continuing current account imbalances in the future, just as
with the equivalent changes in asset supplies considered above.'7
Answer 4: A depreciation of the dollar would be associated with an
appreciation of the franc against the mark rather than
the other way around.
We showed above that the inequality (23) is the condition necessary
for a depreciation of the dollar, whether originating In an increase in
the supply of dollar assets or in the expected future supply of dollar as-
sets, to be associated with an appreciation of the mark against the franc.
Now that we know the matrix of substitutability coefficients is propor—






The conditional variance—covariance matrix estimated in Frankel
[1982, p. 2611 gives values for the relevant terms, shown here in table
6. As of 1980, XM was .12 and XF .05. Thus our estimate of p c1is
a negative number, —1644.2; the condition (23) fails; the dollar depre-
ciation would be associated with a depreciation of the mark against the
franc. This is the same result stated by Giavazzi and Giovannini [1984]:
the portfolio—optimization theory gives the reverse answer from the rela-
tionship generally suspected between the dollar and the franc/mark cross
rate.
As with most of the questions answered above, this conclusion
would follow even if the variance—covariance matrix and asset shares were
computed in somewhat different ways. It is in part a consequence of the
fact that the variance of the mark/dollar rate is greater than the vari-
ance of the franc/dollar rate, which implies that a well—diversified in-
vestor insists on holding both marks and dollars. Similar findings were
obtained in the unconditional variances reported in column (1) of table
5, in the unconditional variance—covariance matrix of real returns (I.e.
allowing inflation rates to be stochastic) estimated in Kouri and de Macedo
[1978], and in the conditional variance—covariance matrix of real returns
estimated in Frankel and Engel [1984]. The conclusion is also in part a
consequence of the fact that francs constitute a considerably smaller pro-
portion of the world portfolio than marks, which implies that a shift of
the portfolio equally into marks and francs would drive up the price of
the franc farther than the price of the mark.Table 6
Mark-Franc Substitutability
B with p =2
quoted on a per annum basis
c-l












How then do we explain the observed tendency of the franc to de-
preciate relative to the mark when the dollar declines in value? A pos-
sible answer is that marks and dollars are in fact relatively close sub-
stitutes, the theory of portfolio optimization notwithstanding. Consider
two lines quoted by Giavazzi and Giovannini (from the International Mone-
tary Fund, Occasional Paper No. 19, May 1983, p. 5): "When the U.S. dol-
lar is relatively weak, mobile international capital seeks alternative
locations, and particularly tends to move to the deutschemark, and vice
versa. With the United Kingdom not actively participating in the EMS,
currencies other than the deutschemark play only a limited role as alter—
native reserve and investment currencies." Given the existence of capi-
tal controls in France, there is little reason for foreign residents to
hold francs unless they need transactions balances for business conducted
in those countries. The absence of substantial capital controls in
Germany, Switzerland, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and
Japan means that these six countries' currencies are the world's invest-
ment assets. The dollar may be a closer substitute for the mark and the
others than the dollar is for the French franc. It would then easily
follow that a portfolio shift out of dollars would tend to be a portfolio
shift into marks rather than into francs, and would cause the mark to
appreciate against the other EMS currencies.—27—
4. CONCLUSION
This paper has tried to show that the hypothesis of mean—variance
optimization has powerful implications for some standard questions of in-
terest to macroeconomists, implications that transcend the particular
methods used for measuring asset supplies and estimating the variance—
covariance matrix. The most striking conclusion is the small magnitude
implied for the risk premium. An increase in the supply of dollar assets
equal to 1 percent of world wealth raises the risk premium that must be
paid on dollar assets by a mere 2 basis points per annum. One corollary
is that a time—varying risk premium does not seem a promising explanation
for any empirical findings of serial correlation or other conditional bias
in the prediction errors made by the forward rate. Another corollary is
that foreign exchange intervention has a negligible effect on the risk
premium.
However, it does not follow that foreign exchange intervention or
other changes in asset supplies need have a negligible effect on the level
of the spot rate. A one—time permanent intervention undertaken so as to
leave interest rates unchanged will affect the exchange rate in the same
proportion as the change in asset supplies. An intervention that changes
expectations of future policy in the same way as a typical innovation in
asset supplies, will change the exchange rate more than proportionately.
The hypothesis of mean—variance optimization implies that the current ex-
change rate is very sensitive to expectations of future changes. If the
expected permanent rate of growth ol the domestic asset supply is raised—28—
as little as 0.1 percent per annum, estimates from mean—variance optimi-
zation imply an increase in the current exchange rate of more than 20
percent.
We have also seen that, under the assumption that the coefficient
of relative risk—aversion is greater than 1, current account surpluses
can have the traditional effects on the exchange rate. The implied ef-
fects are of the same order of magnitude as the effects of changes in
asset supplies, though they must be slightly smaller to the extent that
residents of each country consume goods of the other country.
Finally, we have seen that the hypothesis of mean—variance optimi-
zation implies that a depreciation of the dollar should give rise to a
stronger portfolio shift into francs than into marks; this would tend to
appreciate the franc against the mark, which is the opposite of the cor-
relation generally believed to hold.
In the case of each of these answers, the suspicion may arise that
perhaps the hypothesis of mean—variance optimization is steering us wrong.
No final position is taken here on that issue. But if the degrees of sub-
stitutability that have been discussed here seem impossibly high, it should
be recalled that the working hypothesis in many models, both theoretical
and econometric, has long been perfect substitutability. The hitherto—
persuasive argument against perfect substitutability has been that it re-
quires either risk—neutrality or the absence of any "outside assets," both
highly implausible assumptions.'8 But we now see that conventional esti-
mates of risk—aversion and return variances imply a degree of substitut-
ability so high that for some purposes it might as well be infinite.—29—
FOOTNOTES
'Frankel [1982b] fails to reject the null hypothesis that inves—
tors are risk neutral and the risk premium is nonexistent. The portfolio
consists of six assets, goods prices are assumed to be nonstochastic when
expressed in the currency of the producing country, and investor behavior
is allowed to differ depending on country of residence. Frankel [1983]
and Frankel and Engel [1984] use similar econometric techniques but test
the mean—variance optimization hypothesis itself, and are based on dif-
ferent assumptions: the former assumes a two—asset portfolio while the
latter allows goods prices to be stochastic in any currency, but assumes
that investor behavior is uniform worldwide.
2Among the many other authors testing unbiasedness in the forward
market——most of them rejecting the null hypothesis——are Frenkel [19761,
Cornell [1977], Tryon [1979], Levich [1979], Bilson [1981], Longworth
[1981], Hsieh [1982], Baillie, Lippens and McMahon [1983], Huang [1984],
Park [19841, Gregory and McCurdy [1984], and Hodrick and Srivastava
[1985]. Many of them test whether the forward discount overestimates or
underestimates the tendency of the spot rate to regress toward a mean,
and find the former. The proposition that this finding of "excessive
speculation" (to use Bilson's term) can be explained by a risk premium
can be challenged on the grounds of empirical magnitudes, much like the
finding of autocorrelation.
3Dooley and Shafer [1983] and Cuinby and Obstfeld [1981] also find
serial correlation in the difference between the interest differential
and the ex post rate of currency depreciation.—30—
4One can easily interpret equations (4) and (5) and similar equa-
tions appearing below in an n—asset framework: x is a vector of portfo-
lio shares allocated to the various assets, rp is a vector of expected
rates of return on the various assets relative to a reference asset, A
is a vector of intercept terms and B is a matrix of substitutability
coefficients.
5One approach to testing whether the systematic component of the
prediction error is indeed a risk premii has been to run regressions on
an equation derived from (1) and (5):
(5') (s+1 —fd)=—B'A+ B1x +
Frankel [1982a}, Rogoff [1984], and Booth, Clinton, Cote and Longworth
[1985] found no evidence of a relationship between prediction errors and
asset supplies as in equation (5'); but Park [1984] and Loopesko [1984]
did find such a relationship.
6Note that this special case is much less plausible in the long
run than in the short run. Henderson [19841 describes a central bank
policy of market intervention so as to keep both the exchange rate and
the interest rate constant as a "rates constant" policy.
7See Frenkel [1983, p. 11], Frenkel and Mussa [1980], or the
Bilson, Frenkel and Hodrick papers in Frenkel and Johnson [1978].
should be measured, rather, as the cumulation of the foreign
government deficit (corrected for foreign exchange intervention), analo-
gously to the supply of domestic assets.
9See Kouri and de Macedo [1978].—31—
10Thereasoning suggests an inductive proof that (23) is suffi-
cient to imply a positive effect on s. But some restriction on the
effect of the supply of dollars on the entire expected future path is
also needed for such a proof.
"The derivation assumes that goods prices are nonstochastic when
expressed in the currency of the country producing them, so that the ex-
change rate is the only source of uncertainty. Frankel and Engel [1984]
follow Kouri and de Macedo [1978] arid Dornbusch [1982] in allowing goods
prices to be stochastic like exchange rates; the effect is to modify A
in equation (25), but to leave qualitatively unchanged the answers to
most of the questions considered here.
12 Macedo [1980] and Krugman [19811 refer to the tSamuelsonpre-
sumption' that p =2.Newberry and Stiglitz [19811 summarize the evi-
dence.
'3The constant term component ofrp in equation (4),
—B'A=—pQ[c.(1
—+ -i--] = — — pca.
Fromthe variance estimates in tables1or 3 it follows that the constant
termis on the order of only .01 percent per annum. More generally, em-
pirical studies have found no significant unconditional bias in the for-
ward rate: for example, Cornell [19771 and Frankel [19801. Thus Hansen
and Hodrick [1980] and others refer only to a time—varying risk premium.
'4For purposes of comparison, U.S. and European central banks
(mostly the latter) are estimated to have sold about $5 billion in the
foreign exchange market in early 1985 (Wall Street Journal, March 4 and—32—
11,and Associated Press, March 8). This would represent an increase in
the supply of dollar assets of about 0.3 percent. (Gross U.S. federal
debt outstanding was $1,577 billion at end—1984, from Economic Indicators;
this includes monetized debt but excludes dollar debt issued by foreign
governments.)It also represents a decrease in the supply of foreign as-
sets of the same magnitude, so that the total effect on the relative asset
supplyis larger than 0.3 percent.
15mis follows from footnote 13. In the case of divergent consump-
tion patterns, rp is undefined (overdetermined) under risk—neutrality,
because residents of different countries try to set it at mutually incon-
sistent levels, much like risk—neutral speculators who have divergent ex-
pectations, or agents in any market who have infinitely elastic demands
at divergent prices. But in the limit as p goes to zero, rp goes to
—— ÷ (a—a)w —(a—a)w ]. e 2 er e ra a
16Shares of expenditure on German goods can be calculated at .99
for German residents, .01 for U.S. residents and .47 for rest—of—world
residents (under the highly artificial assumption that all goods were
produced in either Germany or the United States) [Frankel 1983, p. 322].
'71f world wealth is measured as the sum of the outstanding stocks
of government debt, whether monetized or not, of the seven largest coun-
tries ($3,057 billion as of 1982, or $2,465 if only central government
debts are included; OECD Economic Outlook July 1984, p. 29, and Historical
Statistics 1960—82, p. 14), then the recent U.S. current account deficits
of $100 billion are redistributing several percent of world wealth. World
wealth would of course be smaller if only monetized debt were considered—33—
an outside asset. On the other hand, if equities and real estate were
included in the portfolio, world wealth would be higher. Equities alone
are valued at $2,945 billion for the total of twenty countries, as of
December 31, 1984 (Capital International, January 1985). The effect of
the U.S. current account deficit, as of the budget deficit, would dimin-
ish proportionately.
proposition is demonstrated in Frankel [1979]. The absence
of outside assets would have to extend beyond government debt, to money
and real assets.—34—
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